Georgia Straight
for February 1995, Article 2

As many an expert has pointed out, Alcan is vastly exceeding the limits of water spilled over the Kenney dam as permitted by the badly tainted Strangway settlement of 1987. And since Alcan Vice President Bill Rich admits that Alcan is not a "moral" company, but one dedicated solely to the benefit of its shareholders, governments must do the moralizing for them.

Now, supporters on Kemano II will choke on that last line because as they tell it, the immorality was in Premier Harcourt canceling a contract made in 1987. But that argument presupposes that the 1987 agreement was an honest effort to compromise a lawsuit and ought therefore to have been upheld. Well, anyone who has not spent the last few years on the moon knows that it was anything but an honourable attempt at compromise - it was a political fix, plain and simple. Without having the time and with you not having the patience for a re-hash of the deal let's just remember that Fisheries Minister Tom Siddon, whose only obligation was to protect fish, not make industrial development deals, did a sudden last minute turnaround and settled the lawsuit on the eve of his scientists giving evidence that the proposals were catastrophic to salmon runs. The deal was struck in the absence of all seven DFO scientists who had worked on the project and the commission was, in effect, given Alcan's figures to work with. The chairman of the Settlement Group, Dr David Strangway wouldn't know a sockeye salmon from a sea cucumber.

What we are left with are the following serious bits and pieces.

There is the question of compensation which Alcan has carefully moved from about $350 million to near a billion, being the costs they have incurred to date. One also assumes that they will claim lost profits.

This claim can be dealt with summarily if one looks at the facts.

By 1991, the Kemano II project had become utterly unviable economically and Alcan voluntarily closed down the project for that reason.

By 1993 Alcan was in the Premier's office, threatening to close down the project permanently if the government would not make a gigantic financial bailout available. The Premier refused and the entire deal is recorded in Hansard on July 19, 1993.

The second question concerns taking the flows back to Kemano I levels. This must start with Fisheries and Oceans Minister Brian Tobin who must amend the statutory affidavit filed by Minister Siddon wherein the latter said, in effect, that Kemano II was an acceptable risk. No matter that Premier Harcourt has said that Kemano II will not proceed - unless this important bit of housekeeping is taken care of, morality free Alcan will continue to use as much water as they please.

The next step is to establish the flows permitted and police them.

The third question involves the cold water release system Alcan was to put in place for Kemano II. Alcan was, you may remember, going to mitigate the effects of reducing the Nechako to 12% of its natural levels by bringing up cold water from the depths of its reservoir. This would increase the volume of the river and reduce its temperature.

Temperature is critical to spawning salmon. Indeed the British Columbia Utilities Commission held that anything above 18 degrees Celsius was dangerous and it is interesting to note that the Strangway Settlement gave Alcan 21.7 degrees which happened to be the level put forward by Alcan's own hired hands.

It is doubtful in the extreme if this cold water release could have helped spawning chinook and sockeye passing through to the Stuart System because the Kemano II levels were just too low. It can be of assistance when Kemano I levels are returned to, especially during times of high temperatures and low levels. This is where the two senior governments must get together with Alcan - or an independent contractor if Alcan refuses - and see that this cold water release is built.

Throughout the campaign against Kemano II I was involved in on my show, I was suspicious nigh unto sometimes convinced that Alcan didn't want Kemano II to proceed but was making a careful play for damages to recover their investment. I don't know that this was their gameplan, but it is a reasonable hypothesis despite all the money Alcan spent on the BCUC hearings and on advertising. When you are talking 1/2 billion or more what's a few million on lawyers and ad agencies?

Whatever the motives, the course which governments must follow is clear.

They must return the Nechako River to its Kemano I level - which is still unsafe for salmon, mark you - and see that the cold water mitigation method is implemented.

What we need is fast action by both governments for time is short and much damage, lamentably, has already been done.